

## Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-07 IO-10 L-02

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 ISO-00 DODE-00 /088 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/PAB:BASCHENBRENNER

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:DLINEBAUGH

EUR/RPM:GCHRISTIANSON

PM:VBAKER

C:WSHINN

NSC:MHIGGINS (SUBS)

ACDA/IR/REG:THIRSCHFELD

JCS:WWOOD

DOD/ISA:JMORRISON

S/S:JPMOFFAT

----- 056976

R 032345Z JAN 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T STATE 001757

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:MBFR: US ANALYSIS OF FRG FIXED POST MONITORING  
PROPOSAL

REF: USNATO 6996

1. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE COVERING NOTE PROVIDED IN PARA 3

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REFTEL. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT PRESENTATION OF PROS AND CONS

OF FIXED-POST SYSTEM CONTAINED IN NOTE IS SOMEWHAT MORE PREJUDICIAL AGAINST SYSTEM THAN WE WOULD WISH TO BE AT THIS POINT. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND REVISION OF 3.3 AND 3.4 OF REFTEL AS SET OUT BELOW TO EXPRESS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE SYSTEM IN A MORE BALANCED MANNER.

2. BEGIN TEXT. 3. THE WORKING GROUP AGREE WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE US ANALYSIS THAT THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INSPECTION BY STATIC POSTS, WITH MOVEMENT INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA LIMITED TO THESE POINTS BY THE AGREEMENT, ARE THE FOLLOWING:

; ADVANTAGES OF THE FIXED POST SYSTEM

-- PROVIDES VALUABLE MEANS FOR VERIFYING AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND MONITORING MOVEMENT THROUGH DECLARED AND MANNED ENTRY/EXIT POINTS.

-- MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO EXECUTE A MAJOR RAPID BUILD-UP FROM THE USSR UNLESS THE SOVIETS OPTED FOR AN OUTRIGHT ABROGATION OF THE MBFR AGREEMENT PROVISION RESTRICTING THE POINTS OF ENTRY.

-- PROVIDES A LIMITED DETERRENCE AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF USSR FORCES INTO THE NGA BY OTHER THAN AGREED ENTRY POINTS BECAUSE ANY SUCH INTRODUCTION WOULD INVOLVE A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

-- PROVIDES FOR THE FACT THAT NATIONAL/OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION WOULD NEED ONLY TO DETECT ANY MILITARY MOVEMENT THROUGH NON-AUTHORIZED CROSSING POINTS FOR A VIOLATION TO BE DISCOVERED.

B. DISADVANTAGES OF THE FIXED POST SYSTEM. NEGOTIATED INSPECTION LIMITED TO A FIXED POST SYSTEM CANNOT PROVIDE:

-- OBSERVATION OF THE FORCES DEPLOYED WITHIN THE AREA AND OBSERVANCE OF ANY AGREED LIMITATIONS ON SUCH FORCES.

-- RAPID IDENTIFICATION OF ABNORMAL ACTIVITY IN THE NGA WHICH MIGHT INCREASE WARNING TIME.

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-- VERIFICATION OF AGREED PROVISIONS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO ENTRY/EXIT OF NGA, E.G. STORAGE OF EQUIPMENT.

3. THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL BY AIR OR SEA COULD ONLY BE MONITORED AT NOMINATED AIRFIELDS AND PORTS. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A FIXED-POST SYSTEM WOULD DEPEND ON THE SOVIETS USING ONLY THESE NOMINATED AIRFIELDS AND PORTS

FOR AIRLIFT OR SEA TRANSPORT OF TROOPS AND ON THE  
CAPABILITY OF NATIONAL/OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION TO  
DETECT AIR/SEA MOVEMENT OF TROOPS THROUGH OTHER AIRFIELDS  
AND PORTS.

4. A SUFFICIENT FIXED POST INSPECTION SYSTEM IS LESS  
EFFICIENT THAN MOBILE INSPECTION IF A COMPARISON IS MADE  
OF EXPECTED RESULT AGAINST EFFORT. A FIXED POST SYSTEM  
IS ALSO EASIER TO CIRCUMVENT THAN MOBILE INSPECTION.  
THESE TECHNICAL COMPARISONS ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT MOBILE  
INSPECTION TEAMS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO TOUR THE NGA WITH-  
OUT SIGNIFICANT INTERFERENCE AND MAJOR ACCESS  
RESTRICTIONS. END TEXT. KISSINGER

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MONITORING, MILITARY PLANS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 03 JAN 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** CunninFX  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE001757  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** BASCHENBRENNER  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Office:** ORIGIN ACDA  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 USNATO 6996  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CunninFX  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 02 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <02 APR 2003 by MartinML>; APPROVED <15 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** BFR: US ANALYSIS OF FRG FIXED POST MONITORING PROPOSAL  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** NATO BRUSSELS  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006